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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court in Allegheny-Pittsburgh Coal
Co. v. County Commission of Webster County,1 reversed the West
-Virginia Supreme Court, and held that the practices of the Webster
County Tax Assessor in administering ad valorem property taxes
violated the guarantees of equal protection. West Virginia, like many
other states and municipalities, imposes ad valorem taxes on real
property.2 Since an ad valorem taxation scheme requires assessments
based on the value of property, 3 a state or municipality must de-
termine the value of each parcel of property. In West Virginia, all
1. Allegheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n of Webster County, West Virginia, 109
S. Ct. 633 (1989).
2. W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1 ("[Tlaxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State,
and all property, both real and personal, shall be taxed in proportion to its value ... .
3. W. VA. CODE § 11-3-1 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
1
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property is to be assessed at its "true and actual value," defined
as current fair market value.
4
In Webster County, the tax assessor took the legislative require-
ment of assessment at "true and actual value" as a directive to
reassess all recently conveyed land at a percentage of the sale price
stated in the deed. 5 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
found the practice of using the stated consideration in the deed to
determine parcel value as not only valid, but legislatively mandated. 6
This practice also allows West Virginia to recover greater tax revenue
because assessments at purchase price will generally be higher, based
on recent history of real estate appreciation, and will result in reas-
sessments as frequently as land is bought and sold. Despite the prac-
tical merits of the reassessment system adopted in Webster County,
serious legal questions arise when such a system is put into practice.
When a county assessor fails to revise assessments (or makes only
token increases) of other real property comparable to recently con-
veyed parcels, a disparity in assessments occurs if recent sale prices
differ from those on which other assessments are based. This dis-
parity in assessments (and therefore tax burdens) takes on consti-
tutional dimensions because the West Virginia Constitution requires
that all land be assessed on an "equal and uniform" basis. 7 Further,
the United States Constitution allows no state action to deny equal
protection under the laws:" the practice of assessing recently con-
veyed property at the sale price while failing to reassess comparable
4. W. VA. CODE § 11-3-1 (Repl. Vol. 1987) ("All property shall be assessed [by the assessor]
.. . at its true and actual value; that is to say, at the price for which such property would sell if
voluntarily offered for sale . . . ."). See also Killen v. Logan County Commission, 295 S.E.2d 689
(W. Va. 1982) for a detailed discussion of the definition of "value."
5. In Re 1975 Tax Assessments Against Oneida Coal Co., 360 S.E.2d 560, 562 (W. Va. 1987),
cert. granted sub nom. Allegheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n of Webster County, W.
Va., 108 S. Ct. 1268 (1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 633 (1989).
6. Oneida Coal Co., 360 S.E.2d at 562 (citing Kline v. McCloud, 326 S.E.2d 715 (W. Va.
1984)). In interpreting the requirements of W. VA. CODE § 11-3-1 (1987 Repl. Vol.), the court held:
"The price paid for property in an arm's length transaction, while not conclusive, is relevant evidence
of its true and actual value. Such evidence may not be rejected in favor of a Tax Commissioner's
old appraisal." 360 S.E.2d at 562.
7. W. VA. CoNsT. art. X, § 1 ("No one species of property from which a tax may be collected
shall be taxed higher than any other species of property of equal value ... .
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
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property takes on federal constitutional dimensions as well. A di-
lemma exists in attempting to comply with the legislative requirement
of assessment at "true and actual value" while avoiding violation
of the West Virginia and United States Constitutions.
The system of assessing recently conveyed property at its pur-
chase price while leaving assessments of comparable unsold property
essentially intact has become known as the "welcome stranger" ap-
proach.9 The "welcome strangers" in Allegheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co.
v. County Commission of Webster County,10 are four coal com-
panies who purchased property in Webster County, West Virginia.
After exhausting the legal channels available in West Virginia to
have their assessments equalized to that of surrounding property,
the coal companies asked the United States Supreme Court to review
the decision of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.1 2 The
United States Supreme Court found that the actions of the Webster
County Tax Assessor violated the guarantee of equal protection un-
der the United States Constitution. 13
This paper will discuss the opinion of the Supreme Court in
Allegheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co., and its ramifications for the con-
tinuing struggle in applying the legislative directive to assess property
at "true and actual value." The Court, while limiting the manner
in which tax assessors may act, has left open several routes by which
county assessors can comply with the "true and actual" standard
and thus secure greater tax revenue.As the headline of the Charleston
Gazette read, "Supreme Court to review W. Va. property tax sys-
tem," 4 the decision of the Court has determined, not only the fate
9. See, e.g., Comment, Hellerstein v. Assessor of the Town of Islip: A Response to Inequities
in Real Property Assessment in New York, 27 SYRAcusE L. REV. 1045, 1061 (1976) ("[Newly-acquired
parcels, although they may be equivalent in value to the long-held parcels, are assessed for a higher
amount due to appreciation of land values. The 'new' owner-the 'stranger' -will pay higher taxes
proportionately than the owner of a long-held parcel who 'welcomes' the fact that he consequently
pays lower taxes.").
10. Allegheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co., 109 S. Ct. 633.
11. The four coal companies are East Kentucky Energy Corporation, Oneida Coal Co., Inc.,
Shamrock Coal Co., Inc. and Allegheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co., Inc.
12. Allegheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co., 108 S. Ct. 1268.
13. Allegheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co.,. 109 S. Ct. 633.
14. The Charleston Gazette, March 29, 1988, at 1, col. 1-3.
1989]
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of the parties involved, but poses alternatives by which ad valorem
tax assessment may be conducted.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
In 1974, Allegheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co. purchased some 7,300
acres of property in Webster County for a total of $24,624,500.11
Prior to the sale this parcel was assessed for under $500,000.16 In
1976, the Webster County Tax Assessor raised the assessment of the
property to fifty percent 17  of the 1974 purchase price, or
$12,312,290.18 Allegheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co. appealed its annual
assessment to the Webster County Commission, 9 but to no avail.
The assessments remained at the same level until 1983.2
In 1982, Allegheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co. sold its property to East
Kentucky Energy Corporation for $29,842,500.21 In 1984, the As-
sessor again raisdd the assessment to fifty percent of the purchase
price, or $14,921,250. East Kentucky Energy also attempted to have
the assessments lowered by the Webster County Commission, but
its efforts proved fruitless23 The assessment has remained the same
since 1984.2
15. Oneida Coal Co., 360 S.E.2d at 562.
16. Id.
17. During the relevant time period, 1977-1982, W. VA. CODE § 18-9A-11 allowed assessments
from fifty percent to one hundred percent of market value. However, in 1982 the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals ruled that W. VA. CODE § 18-9A-11 violated the "equal and uniform"
requirement of W. Va. Const., art. X, § 1 and was thus unconstitutional. Killen, 295 S.E. 2d. 689.
The provisions of W. VA. CoNsT. art. X, § lb were added in 1983, requiring assessments at sixty
percent of fair market value if and when the reappraisal statutes are implemented. See also supra
note 2.
18. Id.
19. W. VA. CODE § 11-3-24 (Repl. Vol. 1987) provides that the County Commission of each
county will sit as a Board of Equalization and Review, and hear appeals of individual parcel as-
sessments.
20. Oneida Coal Co., 360 S.E.2d at 563.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
[Vol. 91
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In 1977, Shamrock Coal Co., Inc. purchased some 7,783 acres
of coal property in Webster and surrounding counties for
$10,000,000.25 The Webster County Tax Assessor assessed the prop-
erty for $2,933,800, or fifty percent of the sale price ofthe pro-
portionate share of property in Webster County. 26 In May, 1981,
Shamrock Coal Co., Inc. conveyed its land to Oneida Coal Co.,
Inc. without consideration as a result of corporate affiliation.27 Onei-
da's assessment remained at $2,933,800. Shamrock and Oneida also
unsuccessfully attempted to have their assessments revised. 28
From 1976 until the present the Webster County Tax Assessor
has levied taxes against the four companies' real estate, at a weighted
rate per acre from eight to thirty-five times that of the weighted
rate per acre assessment applied to comparable real estate owned
by others and located adjacent to or near that of the petitioners.29
The petitioners, Allegheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co., Shamrock Coal Co.,
Inc., East Kentucky Energy Corporation, and Oneida Coal Co.,
Inc., argued that such a disparity in the weighted rate per acre as-
sessments forced them to shoulder a disproportionate share of the
Webster County tax burden.30
B. Procedural History
Allegheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co., East Kentucky Energy Corpo-
ration, Oneida Coal Co., Inc., and Shamrock Coal Co., Inc., ap-
pealed to the Circuit Court of Webster County, 31 contending that
the Tax Assessor failed to raise the assessments on comparable prop-
erty within Webster County that had not been sold for many years.
32
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Allegheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co., 109 S. Ct. at 637.
30. Brief for Petitioners, Allegheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co., 109 S. Ct. 633.
31. W. VA. CODE § 11-2-24 (Repl. Vol. 1987) provides that the Circuit Court of the county
in which an assessment is disputed shall hear the primary appeal of the assessment.
32. In Re Allegheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co., No. 85-2532, slip op. (Cir. Ct. Webster Co., W. Va.
Nov. 22, 1985) and In Re 1975 TaxAssessments Against Oneida Coal Co., 360 S.E.2d 560 (W. Va.
1987), cert. granted sub nom. Allegheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n of Webster County,
W. Va., 108 S. Ct. 1268 (1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 633 (1989).
19891
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The petitioners argued that such failure violated the West Virginia
constitutional requiremerit of equal taxation and the United States
Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. The Webster County Com-
mission countered that comparable properties withinWebster County
had received three separate ten percent assessment increases during
the period covered by petitioners' complaint. The coal companies
put on evidence that only a small percentage of comparable prop-
erties had received such increases and argued further that the actual
increases were insignificant compared to the disparity between per
acre assessment of their land and that of similarly situated land.3
The Circuit Court held as follows:
[t]he evidence clearly demonstrates, and this Court finds, that though the assessor
and Board of Equalization and Review were lawfully entitled to consider the
consideration declared in petitioners' deeds, in determining their respective as-
sessments, by failing to either equalize assessments by increasing the assessed value
of substantially similar property. . . or. . .lower[ing] petitioners' assessments
. ..the assessor and Board of Equalization and Review violated the Equal and
Uniform clause of Section 1, Article X of the West Virginia Constitution and
the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.1
The Circuit Court also decided that, having the ability either to raise
the assessment of comparable land to that of petitioners' or alter-
natively, to lower petitioners' assessments to that of comparable
land, it would lower the petitioners' assessments on public policy
considerations. 35 The Webster County Commission appealed the de-
cision of the Webster County Circuit Court to the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in a three-two
decision, accepted the factual findings of the Webster County Circuit
Court.3 6 The Supreme Court of Appeals found that "it was the
policy of the assessor's office during the relevant time period to
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. The court held that had it not decided to lower petitioners' assessments, "it seems
probable that individual ownership of real estate of the nature owned by petitioners would shortly
disappear except for those of great wealth."
36. Oneida Coal Co., 360 S.E.2d at 563.
[Val, 91
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assess all recently transferred property on the basis of the declaration
of consideration of value." 37 However, the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals, in reversing the lower court's decision, held that the record
did not support the Circuit Court's determination that the practice
in Webster County constituted intentional and systematic discrim-
ination.38 The appellate court reasoned that "[tihe uniform use of
recent deed values as the basis for appraising property subject to
ad valorem taxation does not violate W. Va. Const., art X, sec. 1.
Any dispute the appellees have with assessments of other landowners
in Webster County may be presented to the board of review." ' 39
Further, the remedy available to an aggrieved taxpayer whose
property is assessed at market value, while others' property is not,
is to seek increased assessment of real property comparable to the
property assessed at market value.4n The court, quoting Killen v.
Logan County Commission,41 decided that: "[i]n the future, tax-
payers who claim that they are being overassessed in relation to other
taxpayers may not have their assessments reduced as long as their
property is valued at market value. Instead they should seek to have
the assessments of other taxpayers raised to market value.''42 The
court did not address the alleged violation of the Equal Protection
clause of the United States Constitution. From this decision, the
four companies petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari, which was subsequently granted. The coal com-
panies asked the Court to review the practice in Webster County,
alleging that such taxing practice violated the United States Con-
stitution's guarantee of equal protection.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 564.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 565.
41. Killen, 295 S.E.2d. at 709. The Killen decision was based on the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals decision in Tug Valley Recovery Center, Inc. v. Mingo County Comm'n, 164 W.
Va. 94, 111, 261 S.E.2d 165, 173 (1979), in which Justice McGraw, writing for the majority, said
that aggrieved taxpayers could either seek to have neighbors' assessments raised or apply for a writ
of mandamus.
42. Oneida Coal Co., 360 S.E.2d at 565.
19891
7
Abdalla: Allegheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission of Webster Cou
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
III. PRIOR UNITED STATES SuPREME COURT RuLINGs
The Court, in analyzing equal protection challenges to states'
real property tax schemes, has adopted two very different standards
of review. The standard used in a particular case depends upon the
method of taxation that the state implements. The Court has viewed
state tax schemes that treat all taxpayers as one class differently
from those schemes that separate classes of taxpayers. In discussing
the prior rulings of the Supreme Court, special emphasis will be
given to the circumstances pertinent to determining which standard
to apply and the remedy available to an aggrieved taxpayer.
A. State Tax Classification Schemes
The Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment re-
quires that "all persons similarly circumstanced be treated alike."
' 43
In Plyler v. Doe,44 the Court stated that "[t]he initial discretion to
determine what is 'different' and what is 'the same' resides in the
legislatures of the states." 45 A classification scheme is a system in
which a legislature treats certain individuals differently than others
for some limited purpose. In most cases the legislatively adopted
classification will receive a low level standard of review, requiring
only that the "classification at issue bear some fair relationship to
a legitimate public purpose." 46 Although the Supreme Court nor-
mally applies a deferential standard in reviewing legislative classi-
fication schemes, the deference is even greater when applied to
classifications made by state legislatures in taxation schemes. 47 Leg-
islatively adopted tax classification schemes will pass equal protec-
tion analysis so long as they are not "invidious" or "palpably
arbitrary. "48
In Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, the Court held:
43. F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
44. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
45. Id. at 216.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) ("[I]n taxation, even more than
other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification.").
48. Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959).
[Vol. 91
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The States have a very wide discretion in the laying of their taxes when dealing
with their proper domestic concerns and not trenching upon the prerogatives of
the National Government or violating the guarantees of the Federal Constitution,
the States have the attribute or sovereign powers in devising their fiscal systems
to ensure revenue and foster their local interests. Of course, the states, in the
exercise of their taxing power, are subject to the requirement of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause Of the Fourteenth Amendment. But the clause imposes no iron
rule of equality, prohibiting the flexibility and variety that are appropriate to
reasonable schemes of taxation.4 9
Furthermore, the Court "has repeatedly held that the inequalities
which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation
or exemption infringes no Constitutional limitation." 50 In applying
this highly deferential standard, the Court has approved state clas-
sification of land uses and special and varied tax rates based upon
such classifications. Tax schemes which differ with respect to cor-
porations and individuals have passed equal protection analysis."
State tax structures which apply only to specific industries have also
withstood constitutional attack. For example, the Supreme Court
has upheld ad valorem tax schemes which apply only to railroads52
or exclusively to public service companies, 53 or utilities.54 The Court,
while permitting classifications based on land usage, has also upheld
classification systems based, not on the use of the land, but on
administrative convenience and expense in the measurement of a
tax.55 In Aero Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Service Commission,
56
the Court allowed different treatment of small income or small tax-
payers from that of wealthier taxpayers.
57
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495, 509 (1937) (citing Mangoun v. Illinois
Trust and Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 293 (1898); American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179
U.S. 89, 94 (1900); Armour Packing Co. v. Lacy, 200 U.S. 226, 235 (1906); Armour & Co. v. Virginia,
246 U.S. 1, 6 (1918); Alaska Fish Co. v. Smith, 255 U.S. 44, 48 (1920); State Board of Tax Com-
missioners v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 537 (1931); Broad River Power Co. v. Query, 288 U.S. 178,
180 (1933); Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 97 (1935)).
51. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973).
52. See, e.g., Columbus & Greenville Ry. Co. v. Miller, 283 U.S. 96 (1931).
53. See, e.g., Atlantic Coastline R.R. Co. v. Daughton, 262 U.S. 413, 421 (1923).
54. See, e.g., Rapid Transit Corp. v. New York, 303 U.S. 573 (1938).
55. Carmichael, 301 U.S. at 511 (citing Citizens Tel. Co. v. Fuller, 229 U.S. 322, 332 (1913);
Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 159 (1903); New York v. Latrobe, 279 U.S. 421, 428 (1929), Aero
Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 295 U.S. 285, 289 (1935).
56. 295 U.S. 285.
57. Id. at 289.
1989]
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Thus, when the United States Supreme Court is confronted with
an Equal Protection objection to a scheme of taxation in which a
class is singled out and forced to pay a higher tax, it will review
the classification in a highly deferential manner, upholding all such
classifications unless they appear "palpably arbitrary" or "invidi-
ous." But how does one determine whether a state has adopted a
classification scheme?
B. Determining the Existence of a Classification System
If a state has adopted a classification scheme either in its con-
stitution or by statute, a classification scheme will be deemed to
exist.5s However, the Supreme Court has been willing to view a tax-
ation scheme as a classification system even where the explicit clas-
sification language is absent or where statutory language prohibits
classification.' 9
Provisions of the West Virginia Constitution article X, sec. 1
prohibits the establishment of separate classes of taxpayers. The West
Virginia Constitution is categorical in its prohibition where it pro-
vides that "no one species of property from which a tax may be
collected shall be taxed higher than any other species of property
of equal value . . . ."6 However, the United States Supreme Court
found constitutionally valid at least one classification system that
flew in the face of a state constitution's tax uniformity clause. The
Court, in Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railway v. Brown-
ing,61 upheld a Tennessee state practice of taxing railroad land dif-
ferently from other land despite a Tennessee constitutional tax
uniformity clause similar to that of West Virginia Constitution ar-
ticle X, sec. 1. Furthermore, the Tennessee Supreme Court failed
to construe the Tennessee constitutional requirement of uniformity
as permitting this type of differentiation of taxpayers. Rather the
state court merely concluded that the public service company which
appealed the case failed to overcome the presumption that the as-
58. See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
59. Nashville, Chattanooga and St, Louis Ry, v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940).
60. W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
61. 310 U.S. 362.
[Vol. 91
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sessors acted within the bounds of the state constitution.62 Thus the
United States Supreme Court was acting without any state directive
(either statutory or judicial) in finding the existence of a classifi-
cation scheme.
The Court in Nashville held, in part, that "[D]eeply embedded
traditional ways of carrying out state policy. . are often tougher
and truer law than that of the dead words of the written text. '63
The Court was willing to find a classification system because the
practice of taxing utility and railroad property at full value while
other property was taxed at less than full value was state-wide, had
been in place for over forty years and was a rather conventional
system. 4 The Court held that "if the state supreme court chooses
to cover up under a formal veneer of uniformity the established
system of differentiation between two classes of property, an ex-
posure of the fiction is not enough to establish its unconstitution-
ality."
65
Thus, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the existence of a
de facto state tax classification system despite explicit state consti-
tutional and judicial language to the contrary. Further the Court
has found such de facto classification schemes constitutionally per-
missible. Therefore, when the Court examines a state taxation scheme,
it can be expected to determine whether such scheme can be char-
acterized as a classification system, depending on the duration of
such a system and its conventionality. If it is ruled a classification
system, it will most likely be upheld as constitutional as long as the
classifications made by the state are not "palpably arbitrary" or
"invidious."
C. Characterizing Taxpayers as One Class
A separate doctrine emerges when discrimination is claimed not
between classes, but within a single class. The second series of cases
62. Id. at 367.
63. Id. at 369.
64. Id.
65. Id.
1989]
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arises under the federal Equal Protection Clause when a state is
accused of "discrimination invidious to a particular taxpayer."66 The
Supreme Court recognizes that "the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the individual from state action
which selects him out for discriminatory treatment by subjecting him
to taxes not imposed on others of the same class." 67 Thus, a right
of action is available to individuals who claim that a state's taxation
policy violates their right of equal protection. In determining what
state taxation acts violate the guarantees of equal protection, the
Court has ruled that "intentional systematic undervaluation by state
officials of other taxable property contravenes the constitutional right
of one taxed at full value." 68 In other words, the Court has found
that if a taxing authority intentionally and systematically assesses
property at less than full value while assessing others within the same
class at full value, that taxing authority violates the federal Equal
Protection Clause.
In Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board of Revision,69 Pennsylvania
assessed all coal property at $260 per acre despite great differences
in actual value. 70 The Supreme Court found the assessment consti-
tutionally repugnant as an intentional and systematic undervaidation
by state officials of some property. 71 "[The fact that a uniform
percentage of assigned value is used, cannot be regarded as im-
portant if, in assigning the values to which the percentage is applied,
a system is deliberately adopted which ignores differences in actual
value .... "72 A system which is not deliberately adopted, but re-
sults from "mere errors in judgments" would not by itself violate
the Constitution.73 A deliberately adopted system can result in in-
tentional systematic discrimination despite a state's belief in the va-
lidity of the system. 74
66. Id. at 368.
67. Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 623 (1946).
68. See, e.g., Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445, 446 (1923).
69. Cumberland Coal Co., 284 U.S. 23 (1931).
70. Id. at 27.
71. Id. at 28.
72. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 25 (citing Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918); Southern
Ry. Co. v. Watts, 260 U.S. 519, 526 (1923)).
74. Id. (citing Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S.
20, 35, 37 (1907); Sioux City Bridge, 260 U.S. 441, 445.
[Vol. 91
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In Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota County,75 an assessor in Nebraska
assessed a bridge at one-hundred per cent of its market value while
assessing all other property and improvements at fifty-five per cent
of their value. 76 Justice Taft, writing for the Court, said that "in-
tentional systematic undervaluation by state officials of other taxable
property in the same class contravenes the constitutional right of
one taxed upon the full vaule of his property. ' 77 The rule set out
in Sioux City Bridge stands despite state constitutional or legislative
requirements of assessment at full value.
The question which next arises is whether the taxpayer suffering
from discrimination may have the assessment lowered to the level
of comparable property or must seek to have the other taxpayers'
assessments raised. The Supreme Court is well settled on this issue.
Justice Taft, in Sioux City Bridge, stated:
This Court holds that the right of the taxpayer whose property alone is taxed at
100 per cent of its true value is to have his assessment reduced to the percentage
of that value at which others are taxed even though this is a departure from the
requirement of statute2'
The view that a taxpayer discriminated against may have his or her
assessment lowered to that on comparable property rather than seek
upward revision of neighbors' assessments was restated in Cum-
berland Coal Co.. Justice Hughes quoted from Sioux City Bridge
"where it is impossible to secure both the standard of the true value,
and the uniformity and equality required by law, the latter require-
ment is to be preferred as the just and ultimate purpose of the
law."179 In Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 0 the Court ruled
similarly, holding that forcing aggrieved taxpayers to seek upward
revision of other taxpayers' assessments is not adequate to protect
respondents' rights under the federal Constitution.8 '
75. 260 U.S. 441.
76. Id. at 444, 445.
77. Id. at 445 (quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co., 247 U.S. at 353). The treatment by the assessor
in this case allegedly violated the Equal Protection Clause despite a Nebraska statute requiring as-
sessment at market value.
78. Id. at 446.
79. Cumberland Coal Co., 284 U.S. at 29 (quoting Sioux City Bridge, 260 U.S. at 446).
80. 326 U.S. 620 (1946).
81. Id. at 623.
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In summary, if a state or local property tax assessment is at-
tacked on grounds that it discriminates against a taxpayer within a
class, the Court will look to see if the discrimination results from
an adopted system of assessment rather than from mere random
errors in judgment by the assessor. If the Court finds that disparate
treatment of taxpayers within a class results from a deliberately
adopted system, the Court will conclude that discrimination exists
and order the assessment of the aggrieved taxpayer lowered to that
of comparable property.
IV. ANALYsIs
A. United States Supreme Court Ruling
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court in Al-
legheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co.,82 held that the actions of the Webster
County Tax Assessor violated the guarantees of Equal Protection
provided by the United States Constitution. After reciting the facts
and legislative history, the Court decided that all taxpayers in West
Virginia are to be treated alike and concluded that the disparate
assessments in Webster County resulted from a deliberately adopted
system of taxation. The Court held that the practice of the Webster
County Tax Assessor did not constitute an adaptation of a state-
employed classification scheme. 3 Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that
"West Virginia has not drawn such a distinction [between newly
conveyed parcels and parcels that had remained unsold]. Its Con-
stitution and laws provide that all property of the kind held by
petitioners shall be taxed at a rate uniform throughout the state
according to its estimated market value." 84 Not only did explicit state
constitutional language prohibit a classification system, but no ev-
idence existed that West Virginia "adopted a different system in
practice from that specified by statute."8 5 Because the actions of
the Webster County Tax Assessor were not indicative of a statewide
82. Allegheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co., 109 S. Ct. 633.
83. Id. at 638.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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practice, the Court was unwilling to find that West Virginia had
adopted a de facto classification system, separating newly conveyed
lands from that land which had remained unsold for a long period
of time.86 The Court declined to express an opinion whether a leg-
islatively adopted classification system which differentiated between
new landowners and those landowners with long-held parcels could
withstand an equal protection attack.
The Court refused to accept the County Commission of Webster
County's argument that its assessment scheme "is rationally related
to its purpose of assessing properties at true market value," 87 holding
implicitly that such argument is reserved for states employing clas-
sification systems.88 The County Commission of Webster County
seemed to confuse the distinction between differences among classes
and discrimination within a class. The Court therefore dismissed the
contention that the proper standard of review in Allegheny-Pitts-
burgh Coal Co. is to uphold such taxation scheme unless it proves
to be "palpably arbitrary" or "invidious," because such a standard
applies only to state tax classification systems. 89 The Court con-
cluded that the assessor was acting on her own initiative in assessing
newly conveyed property at a percentage of the stated consideration
while failing to adequately revise assessments of comparable land
that had remained unsold. 0 In following the rule enunciated in Sun-
day Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield,91 Sioux City Bridge,92 and Cum-
berland Coal Co.,93 "[w]e have no doubt that petitioners have
suffered from such 'intentional systematic undervaluation by state
officials' of comparable property in Webster County."94 Chief Justice
Rehnquist concluded that "[tihe relative undervaluation of com-
parable property in Webster County over time therefore denies pe-
titioner the equal protection of the laws. ' 95 The actions of the
86. Id. at 639.
87. Id. at 637.
88. Id. at 637, 638.
89. Id. at 638.
90. Id. at 639.
91. 247 U.S. at 352.
92. 260 U.S. at 445.
93. 284 U.S. at 28. See also supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
94. Allegheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co., 109 S. Ct. at 639.
95. Id.
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Webster County Tax Assessor violated the fourteenth amendment
of the United States Constitution. The Court then addressed the
remedy available to petitioners to alleviate such discrimination.
The only constitutionally satisfactory remedy for such discrim-
ination is to have the assessments of petitioners' property lowered
to those of comparable parcels:96 "[a] taxpayer in this situation may
not be remitted by the state to the remedy of seeking to have as-
sessments of the undervalued property raised." 97 The Court cited its
previous decisions in Hillsborough,98 Sioux City Bridge,99 Iowa-Des
Moines National Bank v. Bennett,'00 and Cumberland Coal Co.101
in holding that "[tihe Equal Protection Clause is not satisfied if a
State does not itself remove the discrimination, but imposes on him
against whom the discrimination has been directed the burden of
seekingan upward revision of the taxes of other members of the
class." 02 Thus, the Supreme Court implicitly reverses the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals holding in Killen,03 that the remedy
available to an aggrieved taxpayer is to seek upward revision of
comparable land °4
The Supreme Court's decision in Allegheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co.
has ramifications on how the Court will now examine state taxation
schemes. The Court, in not finding a classification system in place
in West Virginia, has in effect refused to expand the legal fiction
of de facto classification schemes, reserving it for only those situa-
tions where a state as a whole has been implicitly classifying land
for a long period.0 5 Such an expansion would have legitimized most
taxation schemes, for the standard of review employed by the Court
(upholding all such classifications unless "palpably arbitrary" or
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 326 U.S. 620.
99. 260 U.S. 441.
100. Iowa-Des Moines Nat' Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 247 (1931).
101. Cumberland Coal Co., 284 U.S. at 28-29. See also supra notes 72-75 and accompanying
text.
102. Allegheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co., 109 S. Ct. at 639.
103. 295 S.E.2d 689.
104. Id. at 709.
105. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
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"invidious") in such situations is so deferential as to be no review
at all.
Furthermore, when a taxing practice is held to be discrimination
invidious to a particular taxpayer within a class, the Court has up-
held, and seemingly will continue to uphold prior rulings that the
only constitutionally satisfactory relief is to have assessments low-
ered to match those of similar undervalued property. The result,
lowering assessments to that of systematically undervalued property,
prevails despite state constitutional language ordering assessments at
market value.
B. Ramifications for West Virginia ad valorem Property Tax
Practices
The Supreme Court's ruling in Allegheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co.
is actually very limited in scope. The Court agreed with the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals that using the consideration stated
in a deed as a proxy for market value does not violate the federal
Constitution. t16 A constitutional violation arises only when the tax
assessor discriminates among taxpayers by assessing recently con-
veyed property at current value while failing to make adequate re-
visions, within a short period of time, in assessments of comparable
land. In addition to the obvious alternative of lowering new buyers'
assessments to comparable old assessments, the Court has left open
to the Webster County Tax Assessor (and other taxing authorities)
the possible course of determining actual value by using the sale
price stated in a deed to assess recently conveyed land, then promptly
revising the assessment on all comparable land in the area to reflect
the current market value.
Another alternative to avoid constitutional violations while in-
suring compliance with the true and actual value standard would be
to employ the enacted, but yet to be implemented reappraisal sta-
tutes.lt 7 The reappraisal statutes, as written, would require that all
106. Allegheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co., 109 S. Ct. at 637.
107. W. VA. CODE §§ 11-lA-I to 11-1A-30 (Repl. Vol. 1987). The reappraisal statutes were
enacted in 1983.
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property be reassessed at sixty per cent of the market value'0 8 of
such property in some base year. It should be mentioned that the
reappraisal statutes clearly continue the prohibition of property tax
classifications. 109 Nothing in the Supreme Court's Allegheny-Pitts-
burgh Coal Co, opinion would prohibit such a comprehensive re-
appraisal plan. Furthermore, such a plan would secure greater tax
revenue for West Virginia because such a comprehensive reappraisal
would reflect the market value of all properties," 0 not just of those
properties that have been transferred and of properties of their sim-
ilarly situated neighbors.
V. CoNcLusIoN
In Allegheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co., the United States Supreme
Court held that the Webster County Tax Assessor's practice of as-
sessing all recently conveyed property at a percentage of the stated
consideration in the deed, while failing to revise adequately the as-
sessments of comparable parcels of land, violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the federal Constitution. The Court upheld a long
series of Supreme Court cases holding that the guarantees of equal
protection are available to taxpayers forced to shoulder a dispro-
portionate share of the tax burden. The Court rejected the West
Virginia practice of requiring taxpayers who have been discriminated
against to seek to have others' taxes raised. Once a taxing authority
is found guilty of discrimination invidious to a particular taxpayer,
the only constitutionally satisfactory remedy is for the assessments
of the aggrieved taxpayer to be lowered to that of the assessments
of comparable land.
The decision does allow states to use stated consideration in a
deed in determining market value of a kind of parcel so long as
the determination is applied evenhandedly to all taxpayers similarly
situated. The decision provides a perfect opportunity for West Vir-
ginia to apply its enacted but not yet implemented comprehensive
108. W. VA. CODE § ll-IA-3(a) (Repl. Vol. 1987) ('Assessed Value' of any item of property
is its assessed value after certification of the first statewide reappraisal and shall be sixty percent of
the market value of such item of property regardless of its class or species . . .
109, Id.
110, Id.
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reappraisal plan that would require all county tax assessors to de-
termine the market value of all parcels in West Virginia and assess
them accordingly. The plan would reduce the risk of county asses-
sors' application of their own reappraisal schemes and Would prevent
actions similar to that held constitutionally impermissible in Alle-
gheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co. Such a comprehehsive reappraisal plan
would help raise some of the public funds which West Virginia so
desperately needs by putting overall assessments of property more
in line with their actual value.
Tarek F. Abdalla
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